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ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION
Accuracy, Error, and Bias in Predictions for Real Versus
Hypothetical Events
David A. Armor and Aaron M. Sackett
Yale University
Participants made predictions about performance on tasks that they did or did not expect to complete. In
three experiments, participants in task-unexpected conditions were unrealistically optimistic: They
overestimated how well they would perform, often by a large margin, and their predictions were not
correlated with their performance. By contrast, participants assigned to task-expected conditions made
predictions that were not only less optimistic but strikingly accurate. Consistent with predictions from
construal level theory, data from a fourth experiment suggest that it is the uncertainty associated with
hypothetical tasks, and not a lack of cognitive processing, that frees people to make optimistic prediction
errors. Unrealistic optimism, when it occurs, may be truly unrealistic; however, it may be less ubiquitous
than has been previously suggested.
Keywords: optimism, optimistic bias, prediction, accuracy, construal level theory
How accurate are people’s visions of the future? The general
consensus, which may be gleaned from even a brief perusal of
research on personal forecasts, is that people are not very accurate
at all. To date, several hundred studies have shown that people’s
predictions tend to be excessively and unrealistically optimistic
(Weinstein, 1998; for reviews, see Armor & Taylor, 1998, 2002;
Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 2002; Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd,
2001). To be sure, some degree of error in personal prediction is to
be expected. As Yogi Berra famously, if mythically, aphorized,
“It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”1
However, people’s predictions appear to be prone not only to
error—random deviations and distortions that would be expected
to balance out over the long run—but to consistent and pervasive
bias. The common conclusion from studies of personal forecasts is
that people expect that their futures will be more pleasant and less
painful than they have any right to expect them to be.
Examples of optimistic biases in personal predictions are not
difficult to find, whether in real life or in the relatively artificial
confines of the research laboratory. Students, for example, tend to
overestimate how well they will do on exams (Shepperd, Ouellette,
& Fernandez, 1996) and to underestimate how long it will take for
them to complete their assignments (Buehler, Griffin, & Ross,
1994). Undergraduate and professional (Master of Business Ad-
ministration) students tend to overestimate their prospects for
success on the job market (Hoch, 1985; Shepperd et al., 1996), and
even gainfully employed professional financial analysts tend to
overestimate corporate earnings (Calderon, 1993; Lim, 2001). A
great deal of research has also shown that people of all ages and
backgrounds tend to overestimate how likely they are to experi-
ence a wide variety of positive outcomes, and to underestimate
how likely they are to experience an even wider variety of negative
outcomes relative to other people (e.g., Weinstein, 1980, 1987; see
also Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Quadrel, Fischhoff, & Davis, 1993; cf.
Heine & Lehman, 1995; for a review, see Helweg-Larsen &
Shepperd, 2001).
Despite the prevalence of these demonstrations, which give the
impression that optimistic biases may be nearly unavoidable (see,
e.g., Weinstein & Klein, 1995), there is a growing body of research
suggesting that this portrait of unwavering optimism may be
overly simplified (see Armor & Taylor, 1998, 2002; Shepperd,
Sweeny, & Carroll, 2006). There are at least two reasons for this.
First, research that provides a clear criterion for evaluating pre-
diction accuracy (e.g., by comparing predictions to attained out-
comes) has shown that people’s predictions often may be optimis-
1 Although commonly attributed to Berra, this statement may be more a
part of the Hall of Fame catcher’s legend than of his loquacious history;
Berra himself admitted “I really didn’t say everything I said” (Berra, 1998).
Near paraphrases have also been attributed, with comparable frequency, to
Nobel Laureate Niels Bohr.
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tically biased without being entirely unrealistic. Research on the
planning fallacy, for example, has shown that whereas people’s
task completion estimates tend to be overly optimistic (in that
people expect to be able to do more in less time than they are
typically able to do), these same estimates tend to be quite highly
correlated with actual task completion times (correlations between
predicted and actual completion times in the initial studies of the
planning fallacy ranged from .36 to .81; see Buehler et al., 1994).
Thus, although biased, these optimistic predictions do not appear
to be completely divorced from reality. One of the goals of the
present research, then, is to provide a clear criterion against which
the accuracy of individual predictions can be assessed.
Second, people do not appear to be indiscriminately optimistic
but to be sensitive to the context in which they make their predic-
tions (Armor & Taylor, 1998, 2002; Shepperd et al., 2006). There
is an accumulating body of research suggesting that people may be
more likely to be overly optimistic in situations in which it is less
likely that the accuracy of their predictions will be tested or
challenged or in situations in which the consequences of being
inaccurate are expected to be less severe. For example, whereas
students tend to overestimate how well they will do on their exams,
this optimism is most prominent (and most unrealistic) when those
exams are some time away; optimistic biases appear to be much
less pronounced as the “moment of truth” draws near (Gilovich,
Kerr, & Medvec, 1993; Shepperd et al., 1996, Study 2). Similarly,
whereas several studies have found that students overestimate how
much they will earn in their first job, students tend to see their job
prospects in more modest terms—and, indeed, accurately estimate
their starting salary—as they approach the market for real (Shep-
perd et al., 1996, Study 1). Even Calderon’s (1993) analysis of
professional analysts’ financial predictions revealed a systematic
decline in optimistic bias as a function of the proximity of the
forecast date to the realization date (although optimistic bias was
evident even among the most proximal predictions).
On the basis of results such as these, Armor and Taylor (1998,
2002) have argued that people are not indiscriminately optimistic,
but are “situated optimists” and that the expression of optimistic
biases is not invariant within persons but rather is largely depen-
dent on the social and psychological context in which people find
themselves.2 The notion that optimistic biases are not inherent
within persons but situated within contexts raises a number of
important theoretical questions—namely, when and why do people
tend to be unrealistically optimistic?—but also raises the question
of whether the prevalence of unrealistic optimism may be over- or
underestimated as a function of the experimental setting in which
unrealistic optimism is typically studied (for similar arguments,
see Gilovich et al., 1993, p. 559). In other words, it is not clear
whether the seemingly common expressions of unrealistic opti-
mism reflect a general tendency for people to be optimistic or an
equally general tendency for psychologists to measure optimism in
settings in which unrealistic optimism may be especially likely to
be expressed.
The Social Psychology of the Unrealistic Optimism
Experiment
In the early 1960s, Orne (1962) published an influential critique
suggesting that psychologists—social psychologists in particu-
lar—should pay careful attention to the psychology experiment as
a “social situation” and that psychologists should be mindful of the
effects that these situations have, above and beyond any effects of
the experimental manipulations, on the thoughts, feelings, and
observable behaviors of research participants. Tetlock’s critique of
decontextualized research on judgmental errors and biases makes
similar arguments (e.g., Tetlock, 1992; Tetlock & Lerner, 1999;
see also Schwarz, 1994).
Although a tremendous number of studies have shown that
people tend to be excessively optimistic, a close look at the
contexts in which these data have been collected reveal that the
overwhelming majority of these studies have been conducted in a
manner that may be especially conducive to the expression of
unrealistic optimism. In most studies, accuracy incentives are
either minimal or absent altogether, as participants are often asked
to make predictions anonymously and without concern about pos-
sible consequences of inaccurate predictions. In many cases the
outcome of participants’ predictions simply cannot be known—by
either the researcher or the person making the prediction—and, as
a consequence, prediction accuracy itself is often impossible to
verify. In the modal study, for example, young, healthy college
students might be asked of their chances, relative to the chances of
other young, healthy college students, of one day succumbing to
cancer, of needing dentures, or of being fired from a job for which
they have yet to be hired. Although these may all be meaningful
questions, and although arguments can be made about their rele-
vance to respondents’ current behavior (e.g., decisions to smoke,
eat sweets, or to develop the “seven coveted habits of highly
effective employees”), these outcomes are also likely to be quite
far removed from most participants’ current concerns. To the
extent that research participants are asked to estimate the proba-
bility of hypothetical outcomes or outcomes that are unimaginably
distant, it seems possible that they may be aware of the fundamen-
tally unverifiable nature of their predictions and that they may,
knowingly or unknowingly, alter their predictions accordingly.
Of course, not all studies of unrealistic optimism have involved
predictions for entirely hypothetical outcomes. Research on the
planning fallacy, for example, has asked participants to make
predictions about tasks they knew they would be completing (see
Buehler et al., 2002, for review), and at least one study (Camerer
& Lovallo, 1999) has found evidence of unrealistic optimism even
when participants could (and did) lose money as a function of their
overly optimistic self-assessments. It is not entirely clear, however,
to what extent participants in these studies may have been even
more optimistic—and potentially more unrealistically optimis-
tic—had predictions been made without the expectation that pre-
dictions would be verified.
2 The notion that optimism is situated does not deny that there are
meaningful individual differences in people’s tendency to be optimistic
(see, e.g., Norem & Cantor, 1986; Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994).
However, studies examining the relationship between optimism as a gen-
eral trait and specific instantiations of optimism in individual predictions
reveal little correspondence between the two (Armor & Taylor, 1998;
Buehler & Griffin, 2003). Our focus, therefore, is on outcome-specific
expectations and not more generalized expectancies captured by measures
of dispositional optimism.
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Predictions for Real Versus Hypothetical Events
The present studies examine the accuracy of predictions people
make for tasks that they do or do not expect to complete. Several
lines of research seemed relevant, a priori, as sources of hypoth-
eses, including Gilovich et al.’s (1993) research on the effects of
temporal distance on subjective confidence; Trope and Liberman’s
(e.g., 2003; Liberman & Trope, 1998) research on construal level
theory; Sedikides, Herbst, Hardin, and Dardis’s (2002) work on
accountability and self-evaluation; and Shepperd et al.’s (1996)
research on the effects of expecting proximate feedback on pessi-
mistic “bracing for the worst.”
In Gilovich et al.’s (1993) experiments, people were found to
predict, optimistically, that they would perform well above aver-
age on tasks that were described as being temporally distant (i.e.,
when the opportunity to complete these tasks was weeks or months
away), but the extent to which people showed this effect of
predicting “better than average” performance was markedly re-
duced when the tasks were described as being temporally proxi-
mate (i.e., when the opportunity to complete these tasks was only
moments away). Although Gilovich et al. (1993) emphasized that
their hypotheses and data pertained to temporal distance, and not
to the real versus hypothetical status of the event in question (see,
e.g., Gilovich et al., 1993, p. 552), there is reason to suspect that
the two variables may have similar effects on people’s predictions.
According to Trope and Liberman’s (2003) construal level theory,
a variety of manipulations—including temporal distance and the
real versus hypothetical status of events—may be functionally
interchangeable as manipulations of “psychological distance.” In-
sofar as hypothetical tasks may be seen as being infinitely tempo-
rally distant, we hypothesize that people will have considerably
greater leeway to make overly optimistic predictions when the task
in question is hypothetical as opposed to real.
Two other lines of work suggest that, regardless of psycholog-
ical distance, the possibility of receiving evaluative feedback may
be the critical independent variable (Sedikides et al., 2002; Shep-
perd et al., 1996; see also Shepperd, Grace, Cole, & Klein, 2005;
Taylor & Shepperd, 1998). The potential for feedback—whether
real or imagined, public or private, externally provided or inter-
nally derived—is one of the characteristics that differentiate real
tasks from hypothetical ones. When tasks are real, one can (and
often will) learn how well one has performed on that task, but
when a task is hypothetical, opportunities for these kinds of reality
checks are largely absent. However, studies demonstrating the
effects of feedback expectations, which generally show a reduction
of optimism, have focused largely on assessments made after
participants had completed a critical task (e.g., estimates of how
well one has performed on a task that one has just completed;
Sedikides et al., 2002; Shepperd et al., 1996, 2005; see also
Sniezek, Paese, & Switzer, 1990). Studies that have examined the
effect of manipulated feedback expectations on pretask predictions
have yielded inconsistent results, sometimes showing no effect
(e.g., Study 2 of Buehler et al., 1994) and sometimes showing a
reduction in optimism (e.g., Taylor & Shepperd, 1998). It is thus
not clear that the expectation of feedback is a necessary precon-
dition for a reduction in pretask optimism.
In the studies reported here, we examine the degree of accuracy,
error, and bias in predictions people make about their performance
on tasks that they believe are either real (i.e., tasks that they will
soon be completing) or hypothetical (i.e., tasks that they do not
think they will complete). We hypothesize that optimistic bias will
be more pronounced in conditions in which participants do not
expect that their predictions will be put to the test and that their
predictions will be less biased—and more accurate—in conditions
in which they do. Studies 1 and 2 set the empirical groundwork for
subsequent theoretical development and evaluation, establishing
whether, in essence, the hypothesized differences in predictions
and in prediction accuracy obtain and, thus, need to be explained.
In Study 3, we next evaluated the necessity of critical feedback in
the real versus hypothetical effects (cf. Sedikides et al., 2002;
Shepperd et al., 1996). In Studies 3 and 4, we also tested a number
of explanatory hypotheses suggested by work on temporal prox-
imity (e.g., preemptive self-criticism, Gilovich et al., 1993; mood
as information, Savitsky, Medvec, Charlton, & Gilovich, 1998;
Shepperd et al., 2005) as well as a number of previously untested
hypotheses derived from Trope and Liberman’s (2003) construal
level theory. We provide further detail about these hypotheses in
the context of the studies designed to test them.
A Note on Accuracy
The present studies share a concern with evaluating the accuracy
of individual predictions. Optimistic biases have been most com-
monly investigated with relative appraisals, that is, assessments of
the extent to which people see themselves as more likely than
others to experience positive events and less likely than others to
experience negative events (e.g., Perloff & Fetzer, 1986; Wein-
stein, 1980). There are, however, several drawbacks to using
relative appraisals as indicators of prediction accuracy. First, these
measures reveal information about bias only in the aggregate and
cannot, on their own, reveal whether any one prediction is accurate
(e.g., if a majority within a group expects to perform better than the
average performing member of that group, many of them will be
right). Second, several recent lines of research suggest that the
appearance of optimistic bias in relative appraisals may reveal
more about respondents’ egocentrism than about optimism or
pessimism per se. For example, whereas people appear to be
overly optimistic when stating relative chances for success on easy
tasks, they appear to be overly pessimistic when stating relative
chances for success on difficult tasks (Chambers & Windschitl,
2004; Kruger, 1999; Kruger & Burrus, 2004). Other anomalies—
such as the observation that optimistic biases appear to be reduced
in Eastern cultures when assessed by relative appraisal methods
(e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1995) but robust when predictions are
compared with obtained outcomes (e.g., Buehler, Griffin, Otsubu,
Lehman, & Heine, 2000; see Buehler et al., 2002, for discus-
sion)—further suggest that measures of relative appraisals may be
assessing something more (or something less) than people’s ten-
dency to be optimistic.
In the context of evaluating potential moderators of optimistic
biases, the ability to assess individual prediction accuracy is crit-
ical. In Gilovich et al.’s (1993) studies of the effects of temporal
proximity, for example, it is certainly possible that the observed
reduction in the better-than-average effect reflected greater accu-
racy among individual participants in the temporally proximate
conditions (an interpretation we are inclined to favor), but it is also
possible that these participants could have become mindlessly
middling, cautiously responding near the midpoint of the available
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response scale without becoming any more accurate in their pre-
dictions, or that some participants may have become overly pes-
simistic while others remained excessively optimistic (thus appear-
ing average only in aggregate). A reduction in bias, therefore, does
not necessarily imply a reduction in error (see, e.g., Buehler et al.,
1994).
In the studies presented here, we assessed predictions in a
variety of ways, including relative appraisals, but in Studies 1
through 3 we also obtained an unambiguous criterion (e.g., test
performance) against which prediction accuracy could be assessed.
With this criterion, deviations from accuracy could be evaluated in
a number of useful but different ways. Evidence of bias was
revealed by signed differences between predictions and perfor-
mance. Evidence of prediction error was revealed by the extent of
absolute deviation between prediction and performance. As an
additional measure of prediction accuracy, we also assessed the
correlation between predictions and performance.
Study 1: The Accidental Scavenger
In Study 1, participants were asked to estimate how well they
would perform on a novel and ultimately highly involving activity:
a scavenger hunt. Half of the participants were informed at the
outset that they would be asked to complete the hunt; the remain-
ing participants were not informed that they would complete the
hunt until after they had made performance predictions. To provide
a basis for comparing predictions with performance (i.e., a crite-
rion for accuracy), all participants were next asked to complete the
scavenger hunt, and their performance was recorded. We hypoth-
esized that participants who did not expect to complete the scav-
enger hunt would exhibit excessive optimism, as is so commonly
demonstrated in studies of people’s personal forecasts, but that
participants who were led to expect that they would complete the
hunt would make more modest—and more accurate—predictions.
Method
Participants
Participants were 38 university undergraduates (58% male) who partic-
ipated in exchange for research participation credit. One additional partic-
ipant failed to respond to a majority of our dependent measures and was not
included in the final sample.
Procedure
In order to protect against social facilitation effects and outright coop-
eration on the scavenger hunt task, participants were tested individually.
Manipulating task-completion expectations. We manipulated partici-
pants’ expectations of whether they would be asked to complete the
scavenger hunt by altering the manner in which the scavenger hunt was
introduced. Half of our participants were told, from the start, that their task
as participants would be to evaluate a scavenger hunt and then to complete
the hunt that they evaluated. Remaining participants were told that they
would be asked to evaluate the scavenger hunt, but no mention of actual
performance was made.
The scavenger hunt. The scavenger hunt task was similar to one used
in prior research (for details, see Armor & Taylor, 2003). The hunt was
described as a 30-min activity in which participating “scavengers” would
be required to find as many items as they could from a list of 32 objects
(e.g., a safety pin, a party invitation, a library book). All items could be
found, with varying degrees of effort and ingenuity, on the university
campus. A number of simple rules (e.g., one must hunt alone; no item may
be stolen or purchased for the purpose of the hunt, etc.) were included to
give all participants a common frame of reference.
Predictions and task evaluations. In order to bolster the task-
expectation manipulation, the phrasing of the task assessment and predic-
tion measures was altered to correspond to the experimental condition:
Participants who were led to expect that they would complete the scaven-
ger hunt were asked to evaluate the hunt and to make performance
predictions as if it were an impending reality (e.g., “How well will you do
on the scavenger hunt?”), whereas participants who were not led to expect
that they would complete the scavenger hunt were asked to evaluate the
hunt and to make predictions as if it were hypothetical (e.g., “how well
would you do, if you were asked to complete the scavenger hunt?”).
Performance predictions were obtained both in general terms, by asking
participants how well they thought they would [will] do on the scavenger
hunt, on a scale ranging from 1 (extremely poorly) to 7 (extremely well),
and in very specific terms by asking participants how many of the 32 items
listed they thought they would [will] find in the allotted time. In order to
assess relative appraisals, participants were also asked to estimate how well
the “typical student” at their university would perform on the scavenger
hunt (as with the personal predictions, predictions of others were requested
in both general and specific terms); these estimates could then be compared
with self-estimates in order to derive relative evaluations. An additional
specific assessment asked participants to estimate how long it would take
them to find half of the items on the list (in minutes) if they did not have
a time limit.
For exploratory purposes, we asked participants to make several addi-
tional general assessments, including: how much fun participants thought
the scavenger hunt would [will] be, how much they thought they would
[will] enjoy participating in it, how difficult they thought the scavenger
hunt task would [will] be, and how good they were at this sort of game.
Responses to all general assessment questions were made on 7-point scales.
Performance. Once participants completed the dependent measures,
they were asked to complete the scavenger hunt. Participants were
equipped with a stopwatch so that they could keep track of elapsed time
and a shopping bag in which to carry scavenged items. They were re-
minded of the rules and of the 30-min time limit and were then prompted
to begin at the experimenter’s cue (the experimenter also started a stop-
watch at this time in order to have an independent assessment of how long
participants took to complete the hunt). At the end of the scavenger hunt,
participants returned to a different experiment room and were greeted by a
different experimenter who was blind to the participant’s task-expectancy
condition and performance predictions (but not to elapsed time). This
experimenter administered a brief performance assessment questionnaire
and tallied the number of items collected.
Results
Preliminary analyses revealed no interaction effects with partic-
ipant gender in this or any subsequent study. Thus, this variable is
not discussed further.
Performance Predictions
As hypothesized, the task-expectation manipulation had a con-
siderable impact on performance predictions, with participants in
the task-expected condition being consistently less optimistic than
participants in the task-unexpected condition. As can be seen in
Table 1, in which means and corresponding inferential statistics
are presented, the effects of the task-expectancy manipulation
tended to be more pronounced when the performance predictions
were assessed with the use of specific, unambiguous (and therefore
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potentially verifiable) response options. Although responses to the
more global, ambiguously defined prediction and task-assessment
questions were in the hypothesized direction, these differences
rarely approached statistical significance. By contrast, the effect of
task expectancy on responses to the more specific, objectively
scaled prediction measures were clear-cut: Participants who were
led to expect that they would complete the hunt thought that they
would find considerably fewer items ( p ! .001), that other scav-
engers would also find fewer items ( p ! .044), and that they
would require more time to find half of the items on the list ( p !
.011) than did participants who did not expect to complete the
scavenger hunt.
It is worth noting that neither group displayed the often dem-
onstrated better-than-average effect. Indeed, participants in the
task-expected condition thought that they would perform worse, on
average, than the average participant. This apparent over-
pessimism effect was nearly significant when comparing partici-
pants’ predictions for self and other on the general measures of
predicted performance, t(18) ! 2.00, p ! .061, and clearly sig-
nificant when comparing the number of items participants ex-
pected that they and others would find, t(18) ! 2.60, p ! .018.
Even those who did not expect to complete the hunt, who generally
appeared to be more optimistic, did not expect to outperform the
average participant, both ts(18) " 1.
Performance
Performance on the scavenger hunt was assessed by tallying
the number of items each participant returned. Despite the fact
that participants came to the task with markedly different per-
formance predictions, participants in the two experimental con-
ditions did not differ in terms of performance: Those in the
task-unexpected condition returned with 10.8 items, on average,
whereas those in the task-expected condition returned with 11.2
items, t(36) " 1.0, ns.3
Accuracy, Error, and Bias
The principal analyses of these data involved comparing pre-
dictions with performance. As hypothesized, evidence of predic-
tion accuracy, error, and bias differed markedly as a function of
participants’ experimentally induced expectations of whether they
would complete the scavenger hunt (see Table 2). Participants who
did not expect to complete the scavenger hunt were considerably,
and unrealistically, optimistic, expecting to find, on average, over
50% more items (M ! 16.7) than they actually found (M ! 10.8),
t(18) ! 4.25, p " .001. The magnitude of this optimistic bias was
significantly reduced in the task-expected condition, t(36) ! 4.24,
p " .001. In fact, participants who did expect to complete the hunt
expected to perform somewhat worse (M ! 10.3) than they actu-
ally performed (M ! 11.2), though this apparent over-pessimism
effect was not significant, t(18) ! 1.09, ns. Thus, participants in
this study did overestimate how well they would perform, display-
ing excessive optimism, but only if they did not expect to complete
the scavenger hunt.
Results from several additional analyses suggest that partici-
pants in the task-expected conditions were not only less biased but
were also more accurate (see Table 2). For example, the standard
deviation of the prediction–performance discrepancies was signif-
icantly smaller in the task-expected condition than in the task-
3 A substantial proportion of participants (53%) failed to complete the
scavenger hunt within the 30-min time limit, though over three quarters
(76%) returned within 1 min of the deadline. Only three scavengers (8%)
returned more than 5 min late (two from the task-unexpected condition, one
from the task-expected condition). Although neither the tendency to return
late nor the overall time spent on the scavenger hunt differed significantly
between conditions, we did conduct additional analyses that adjusted the
number of items returned to correct for advantages of coming in late (cf.
Armor & Taylor, 2003). These analyses yielded results that were substan-
tively similar to the uncorrected return numbers. Thus, we report analyses
of raw performance scores; one exception is noted in the text.
Table 1
Performance Predictions as a Function of Whether Participants Expected to Complete the
Scavenger Hunt (Study 1)
Measure
Task completion expectation
F(1, 36)Not expected Expected
General/global predictions
Predicted performance (self) 4.21 3.58 1.40
Predicted performance (others) 4.32 4.16 0.18
Self–other difference #0.11 #0.58 1.16
Specific predictions
Predicted number of items found (self) 16.68 10.32 12.58**
Predicted number of items found (others) 16.42 12.74 4.37*
Self–other difference 0.26 #2.42 4.17*
Time to find half of items on list 40.74 76.73 7.12*
Other measures
Task difficulty 4.63 5.05 1.06
Personal efficacy 4.68 3.84 2.87†
Anticipated enjoymenta 3.97 4.00 0.00
a Responses to questions assessing anticipated fun and anticipated enjoyment were almost perfectly correlated,
r(38) ! .97, and therefore were averaged prior to analysis.
† p " .10. * p " .05. ** p " .01.
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unexpected condition, as determined by a Levene test, F ! 7.61,
p ! .009, indicating smaller average discrepancies in this condi-
tion. A more direct assessment of absolute error, calculated simply
as the absolute value of the difference between predictions and
performance, was significantly smaller for the task-expected group
than it was for the task-unexpected group, t(36) ! 3.05, p ! .005.
Another way of looking at the accuracy of participants’ predic-
tions is to examine the correlation between predictions and per-
formance. Among those who expected to complete the scavenger
hunt, this correlation was substantial and significant (r ! .76, p "
.001). Among those who did not expect to complete the scavenger
hunt, the correlation between predictions and performance was
more modest (r ! .44; p ! .059), although even this seemingly
respectable correlation appears to have been inflated by a few
participants who took considerably longer than the time allowed to
complete their hunts (see Footnote 3). If one controls for the
amount of time participants took to complete the hunt, the resulting
partial correlations between predictions and performance were .79
( p " .001) in the task-expected condition and .33 ( p ! .19) in the
task-unexpected condition. These partial correlations are signifi-
cantly different from one another, z ! 2.06, p ! .039.4 It appears,
then, that the predictions of participants in the task-unexpected
condition were not only optimistically biased but also truly unre-
alistic, insofar as these predictions bore very little relation to
subsequent performance, whereas predictions made by participants
in the task-expected condition were considerably more accurate.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that
optimistic biases are not invariant within persons, but situated
within contexts, and that these biases are more strongly expressed
in situations in which they are less likely to be challenged or tested
(Armor & Taylor, 1998, 2002). The results of Study 1 are also
broadly consistent with the results of Gilovich et al.’s (1993)
studies of temporal proximity but show that (a) the reduction of
optimistic biases can occur for real (as opposed to hypothetical)
tasks just as for proximate (as opposed to distant) ones and that (b)
this reduction in bias in not an artifact of the method of measure-
ment (i.e., relative appraisals). In fact, the measure of relative
appraisals used in Study 1 revealed a seemingly anomalous find-
ing: Had relative appraisals been used as a sole indicator of our
participants’ prediction accuracy, participants who were not ex-
pecting to complete the task would have appeared to have been
more accurate, not less (they expected, on average, to perform
about as well as the average participant), whereas participants who
did expect to complete the task appeared to have been excessively
pessimistic (having expected to perform worse than average) de-
spite having quite accurately predicted their own performance.
Although these results were not expected, they are not entirely
unprecedented: Savitsky et al. (1998) obtained similar worse-than-
average effects in conditions of temporal proximity, and expecta-
tions of average performance in conditions of temporal distance, in
a study designed to closely replicate the procedures of Gilovich et
al. (1993). The relationship between different indicators of predic-
tion accuracy were examined further in Study 2.
The scavenger hunt task used in Study 1 has a number of
advantages (e.g., participants found it to be novel and engrossing),
but it also has a number of disadvantages that may limit the
generalizability of the results that we obtained. First, although
participants appeared to be quite engaged with the task (many
returned at full sprint, sweaty and out of breath), the scavenger
hunt was ultimately just a game, and some may have found it to be
trivial or unimportant. Second, participants in the task-expected
condition may have achieved greater accuracy by applying a stop
rule, that is, by finishing their hunt once they found the number of
items they predicted they would find. (Several pieces of data argue
against this possibility, however: Participants in the task-expected
condition did not finish their hunts earlier than participants in the
task-unexpected condition, and they did not find fewer items
despite making more modest predictions.) Third, not all partici-
pants finished the scavenger hunt on time, which may have influ-
enced the results (although corrections described in Footnote 3
suggest that this was not the case). To address these potential
limitations in Study 2, we used a performance task that was
familiar, important, and less vulnerable to a stop-rule strategy, in
4 If one simply excludes data from participants who returned more than
5 min late, the prediction–performance correlation in the task-unexpected
condition drops to .35 ( p ! .18); excluding data from participants who
returned more than 1 min late drops the correlation to .19 ( p ! .53).
Removal of similarly tardy scavengers from the task-expected group leaves
the correlations virtually unchanged (rs ! .76 and .80, ps " .001).
Table 2
Accuracy, Error, and Bias in Performance Predictions as a Function of Whether Participants
Expected to Complete the Scavenger Hunt (Study 1)










Pearson’s r .44 .76***
*** p " .001 (significantly different from zero).
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addition to being a task for which the time limit could be more
strictly enforced.
Study 2: Pop Quiz
In Study 2, participants were asked to evaluate (and then to
complete) a specially crafted test of questions that were described
as being drawn from future versions of the Graduate Record
Examination (GRE; Educational Testing Service, 2005). To ensure
that this test would be important and familiar to our study partic-
ipants, we recruited a sample of individuals who were both expert
in taking standardized academic tests and invested in doing well on
them (Yale University undergraduates).
Method
Participants
Seventy-five undergraduates (49% women) who were enrolled in an
introductory psychology course at Yale University participated in the study
in exchange for research participation credit.
Procedure
Participants were tested individually and in small groups of no more than
three. In order to heighten the perceived importance of the GRE test,
participants were told that the study was part of a joint project between the
university psychology department and the Educational Testing Service
(ETS) and that the experimenters would be asking the participants to
evaluate a set of questions that the ETS was considering for use in future
versions of the GRE.
Manipulating task-completion expectations. As in Study 1, half of the
participants were informed upfront that they would be asked to complete
the set of GRE questions after answering an initial set of questions about
it; remaining participants were told that they would be asked to respond to
questions about the test, but no mention was made that anyone would
actually be completing the test until after they had responded to the
prediction measures. All test materials and prediction measures were
phrased in condition-appropriate ways (e.g., “you will be asked. . .” vs.
“test takers would be asked. . .”).
The test. The test itself was a time-limited, 20-item test consisting of
moderate to difficult questions taken from verbal sections of past GREs.
Participants in each test-expectancy condition were randomly assigned to
evaluate (and then to complete) one of three different tests, each consisting of
only one type of GRE test question: analogies, antonyms, or sentence com-
pletions. All participants were provided with a thorough description of their
particular test as well as some factual information that could, in principle, be
used as a basis for making predictions. For example, participants were told that
students nationwide have, on average, answered approximately 8 of the 20
questions correctly when answering these questions as part of the full GRE
general test. Participants were also provided with a representative sample
question of approximately the same average difficulty as the items that would
appear on their test, as well as an official ETS-supplied explanation of the
correct answer (these explanations were obtained from the ETS website, at
http://www.gre.org/practice_test/takesc.html).
Prediction measures. As in Study 1, participants were asked to make
a general prediction (“How well do you think you will [would] do on the
sample test?”), to which they responded on a 7-point scale, and a specific
prediction (“How many out of 20 questions do you think you will [would]
answer correctly?”). In order to assess relative appraisals, participants were
asked to make a single prediction about how well they would perform
relative to other students on an 11-point percentile scale ranging from 0%
(not better than any other Yale student) through 50% (better than half) to
100% (better than all other Yale students).
For exploratory purposes, we also asked participants to evaluate their
confidence in the accuracy of their prediction, their belief in how well they
generally do on these kinds of tests, and how diagnostic they thought the
test would be in terms of determining their academic potential. Responses
to these questions were assessed on 7-point scales, with higher numbers
reflecting greater confidence, efficacy, and diagnosticity.
Taking the test. After providing their responses, all participants were
asked to complete the 10-minute GRE test. Participants were then asked a
number of follow-up questions, probed for suspicion, and debriefed.
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses revealed unexpected differences in partic-
ipants’ Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) Verbal scores across con-
ditions (test-unexpected M ! 719, test-expected M ! 743),
t(73) ! 1.90, p ! .06. Accordingly, all analyses used these scores
as a covariate. Additional analyses did not reveal any interactions
with gender or test type; all subsequent analyses therefore collapse
across these variables.
Performance Predictions
As in Study 1, and as can be seen in Table 3, the test-expectancy
manipulation consistently influenced the predictions participants
Table 3
Performance Predictions as a Function of Whether Participants Expected to Complete the
Graduate Record Examination (Study 2)
Measure
Test completion expectation
F(1, 72)Not expected Expected
Prediction measures
General prediction (how well?) 4.57 3.90 4.71*
Specific prediction (how many?) 11.91 10.19 4.09*
Relative appraisal (better than %) 50.52 42.13 4.23*
Other measures
Personal efficacy (testing ability in general) 5.53 5.38 0.46
Confidence in prediction accuracy 4.06 3.92 0.66
Diagnosticity of test 3.19 3.01 0.54
Note. Means and inferential statistics have been adjusted for Scholastic Aptitude Test scores.
* p " .05.
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made about their performance on the GRE test. Participants in the
test-unexpected condition thought they would perform better ( p !
.033), that they would answer more questions correctly ( p! .047),
and that they would outperform a larger percentage of students at
their university ( p ! .043), than did participants in the test-
expected condition. The manipulation did not, however, influence
people’s beliefs about their general test-taking ability, their confi-
dence in the accuracy of their predictions, or the extent to which
they saw the test as diagnostic of their academic potential.
Again, as in Study 1, neither group of participants believed that
they would perform better than average. Although Study 2 used a
more direct measure of relative appraisals, the results were similar:
On this measure, participants in the test-unexpected condition give
the appearance of being reasonably accurate, expecting on average
to perform about average (M ! 51st percentile), while participants
in the test-expected condition expected to perform significantly
worse than average (M! 42nd percentile), t(37)! 2.78, p! .004.
Performance
As in Study 1, performance did not differ as a function of the
test-expectancy manipulation. Although there was a trend for
participants who expected to complete the test to perform a bit
better (M! 10.2) than participants who did not expect to complete
the test (M ! 9.5), this difference was not significant, F(1, 72) !
1.15, ns.
Accuracy, Error, and Bias
As in Study 1, participants who expected to complete the test not
only made more modest predictions than did participants who did
not expect to complete the test, but they made more accurate
predictions as well (see Table 4). Participants who did not expect
to complete the test significantly overestimated how many ques-
tions they would answer correctly, t(37) ! 3.55, p ! .001, show-
ing a clear optimistic bias, whereas participants in the test-
expected condition did not, t(38) " 1, ns. This reduction in bias is
significant, F(1, 72) ! 6.09, p ! .016. The average absolute error,
again taken as the mean absolute value of the difference between
predictions and performance, was also significantly greater among
those who were not expecting to complete the test than among
those who were expecting to complete the test, F(1, 72) ! 8.03,
p ! .006. The difference in the correlation between predictions
and performance was similarly substantial: For those not expecting
to take the test, the correlation between predictions and perfor-
mance was negligible (r ! .05, p ! .76), but for participants who
did expect to complete the test, this correlation was positive and
strong (r ! .52, p " .001). These correlations are significantly
different from one another (z ! 2.18, p ! .029).
Study 3
Although Studies 1 and 2 used very different performance tasks,
the results were the same: In both, predictions were unrealistically
optimistic in the task-unexpected conditions but impressively ac-
curate in the task-expected conditions. Notably, in both studies, the
tasks under consideration were quite specific, and the amount of
information provided to participants was held constant across
conditions. Therefore, between-condition differences in predic-
tions and prediction accuracy in these studies cannot be attributed
to differences in the amount of information available about the




One important distinction that has been left unresolved in Stud-
ies 1 and 2 is whether the effects of the real versus hypothetical
nature of the task were due to the effects of expecting to complete
the task, as we have suggested, or whether our effects have been
the consequence of differences in expectations about the possibil-
ity of critical feedback. In Studies 1 and 2, expectations about
completing the test were potentially confounded with expectations
about the availability of evaluative feedback. Although no mention
of feedback was made in either study, participants in the task-
expected conditions may have nonetheless worried about the pos-
sibility of receiving feedback and made less optimistic predictions
either (a) in an effort to avoid disappointment of unmet expecta-
tions (self-protection; e.g., Shepperd et al., 1996; Taylor & Shep-
perd, 1998; see also Josephs, Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992;
Larrick, 1993) or (b) in an effort to avoid looking foolish in the
eyes of others (public accountability; e.g., Study 2 of Regan,
Gosselink, Hubsch, & Ulsh, 1975; Sedikides et al., 2002; see also
Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992; Tetlock & Kim, 1987). In
Study 3, we attempted to disambiguate the effects of test comple-
tion expectations from feedback expectations by manipulating
these expectations independently.
Mood
Mood has been found to mediate the effects of temporal prox-
imity (Savitsky et al., 1998) and feedback proximity (Shepperd et
al., 1996, 2005) on performance predictions and post-task perfor-
mance evaluations. In these studies, it is generally assumed that the
proximity of performance (or of feedback) induces feelings of
nervousness, which is then interpreted as a physiological signal
that one will not, or did not, perform so well (see also Schwarz &
Table 4
Accuracy, Error, and Bias in Performance Predictions as a
Function of Whether Participants Expected to Complete the
Graduate Record Examination Test (Study 2)











Pearson’s r .05 .52***
Note. Means and inferential statistics have been adjusted for Scholastic
Aptitude Test scores; adjusted standard deviations are listed in parentheses.
** p " .01. *** p " .001 (significantly different from zero).
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Clore, 1983, 2003). Although it was not clear why this hypothesis
would predict greater accuracy rather than greater pessimism, we
tested for possible effects of mood in Study 3 by assessing mood
at the time participants made predictions.
Construal Level
According to construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003),
various manipulations of “psychological distance” will meaning-
fully influence the level of abstraction at which actions, events,
and persons are mentally represented. Although most studies of
construal level theory have focused on manipulations of temporal
distance (e.g., Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Liberman &
Trope, 1998; Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003), Trope and
Liberman (2003) have speculated that other manipulations, includ-
ing the real versus hypothetical nature of events and actions, may
effectively manipulate psychological distance as well.
In the context of the present studies, construal level theory
suggests that hypothetical events will be represented in more
abstract, high-level terms and that real, proximal events will be
represented in more concrete, low-level terms. As Trope and
Liberman (2003) described the distinction, “high-level construals
are relatively simple, decontextualized representations that extract
the gist from available information,” whereas “low-level constru-
als tend to be more concrete and include subordinate, contextual,
and incidental features of events. . . low-level construals are thus
richer and more detailed but less structured and parsimonious than
high-level construals” (p. 405). At a higher, more abstract level,
the GRE test may be thought of as a meaningful academic exercise
on which participants will want to perform well. Such a represen-
tation could thus motivate people to be optimistic, as successful
performance could be seen as symbolic of the test taker’s intel-
lectual potential. At a lower, more concrete level, by contrast, the
GRE test may be thought of in terms of broken pencils, smudgy
erasers, and impending time limits—not the kind of high-level
terms that would inspire optimistic predictions. When thinking of
the test at this lower level, then, participants in the test-expected
conditions may be more mindful of a host of contextual factors
(e.g., testing conditions, their own level of alertness, etc.) that may
be peripheral to the “gist” of the GRE test but relevant to making
an accurate prediction.
In an effort to assess these different levels of construal in Study
3, we asked participants to do two things: to recall very specific
details about the GRE test, and to indicate, in essence, how
meaningful they thought the test would be. To the extent that
participants in the test-unexpected condition were representing the
GRE test in abstract, high-level terms, they should be expected to
have greater difficulty remembering specific details of the test;
participants in the test-expected conditions, by contrast, were
expected to form more concrete, lower-level representations of the
test and thus were expected to remember more test details. The
higher-level representation of the GRE test was also expected to be
a more meaningful representation. We hypothesized that partici-
pants in the test-unexpected conditions would thus see more value
in the test, and attach greater significance to their imagined per-
formance on the test, in comparison with participants in the test-
expected conditions who were expected to “dismiss the forest for




Seventy-five undergraduates (37 women and 38 men) from an introduc-
tory psychology course were recruited to participate in exchange for
research participation credit. Four additional participants did not attend to
experimental instructions and thus were not included in the final sample.
Procedure
The test and cover story were identical to those used in Study 2:
Participants were informed that they would be asked to evaluate (and, in
some conditions, to complete) a test containing GRE questions that the
ETS was considering for future examinations.
Manipulating performance and feedback expectancies. Two thirds of
participants were assigned to one of two test-expected conditions in which
they were told that they would be taking the test. Of these participants, half
were assigned to a “feedback-expected” condition: These participants were
told that they would be scoring their own test at the end of the study and
thus would know how they performed on the test. The remaining partici-
pants in the test-expected conditions were assigned to a “no-feedback”
condition: they were told that the ETS would not allow participants to
review the answers to test questions, that even the experimenter was not
informed of the test answers, and that the experimenter would not be
allowed to see the participants’ responses. To make this manipulation
believable, participants in the no-feedback condition were told that they
would be asked to seal their materials from the session, including their tests
and answer sheets, in a stamped envelope addressed to the Educational
Testing Service and to deposit these envelopes into a U.S. mail bin that had
been placed in the test room.
The remaining third of the participants was assigned to a test-unexpected
condition identical to that of Study 2: They were told that they would be
asked to answer questions about the test, but no mention was made of
participants actually having to complete the test.
Predictions and other measures. The prediction questions were the
same as in Study 2, except that the efficacy question was not included. In
addition, participants were asked to estimate their best and worst possible
scores on the test.
In order to assess participants’ representation of the test (i.e., as an
indicator of construal level), participants were asked a series of questions
about how meaningful they thought the test would be: They were asked
how important it was for them to perform well on the test, how pleased they
would be if they performed better than they expected, and how disap-
pointed they would be if they performed worse than expected. The partic-
ipants were also asked how diagnostic they thought the test would be and
how important it was to make an accurate prediction.
Participants were next asked to indicate how they felt “at that moment”
by completing a brief measure of current mood (consisting of 10 items
taken from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule [PANAS]; Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; sample items included enthusiastic, happy, dis-
tressed [reverse scored] and nervous [reverse scored]; $ ! .71). In order to
assess the extent to which participants had attended to test details (i.e., as
a second measure of construal level), all participants were then asked to
recall specific pieces of information from the test description. In a free-
recall task, administered first, participants were asked to simply recall as
much information as they could about the test (i.e., from the one-page
information summary that they had read earlier in the study). A subsequent
cued recall test asked participants to recall four specific details from the
information page (e.g., the amount of time given for the test, the number of
questions answered correctly in a nationwide sample of GRE test takers,
etc.).
As a manipulation check, participants in the two feedback expectancy
conditions were asked to recall whether they would receive their scores on
the test (all remembered correctly). After providing their responses, all
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participants completed the 10-min GRE test and then were asked to
complete several additional measures not central to the present
investigation.
Results and Discussion
Primary hypotheses were tested with pairs of orthogonal con-
trasts conducted in the context of a series of univariate analyses of
covariance (ANCOVAs) in which participants’ SAT Verbal scores
were entered as the covariate. The first of these contrasts analyzed
the test-expectancy effect by testing for differences between the
test-unexpected group and the two test-expected groups. The sec-
ond contrast tested the effects of the feedback expectancy manip-
ulation within the two task-expected conditions.
Performance Predictions
As was the case in Studies 1 and 2, performance predictions
were influenced by the real versus hypothetical nature of the GRE
test. As can be seen in Table 5, in comparison with participants in
the two test-expected conditions, participants who did not expect
to complete the test tended to make more optimistic general
predictions ( p ! .094) and made significantly more optimistic
specific predictions ( p ! .010), expecting to answer over 15%
more questions correctly than did participants in the test-expected
conditions. Participants who did not expect to complete the test
also tended to imagine a better best-case score ( p ! .086) and
made significantly less pessimistic worst-case score predictions
( p ! .003) than participants in the test-expected conditions. In
contrast to Studies 1 and 2, participants’ predictions about their
relative standing on the GRE test were not influenced by the
test-expectancy manipulation.
As can also be seen in Table 5, the feedback expectancy ma-
nipulation did not significantly affect any of the prediction mea-
sures, suggesting that it is the knowledge that one actually has to
complete the task, and not the (normally associated) opportunity
for feedback, that influences people’s predictions.
Performance
Performance was once again not influenced by the test-
expectancy manipulation, t(71) ! 1.16, p ! .25, and it was also
not influenced by the feedback expectancy manipulation, t(71) !
1.06, p ! .29. On average, participants answered 10.2 questions
correctly.
Accuracy, Error, and Bias
Our indices of prediction accuracy were strongly and signifi-
cantly influenced by the test-expectancy manipulation but not by
the feedback-expectancy manipulation (see Table 5). Although
Table 5
Effects of Test and Feedback Expectancy on Predictions, Prediction Accuracy, and Other Measures (Study 3)
Measure












General prediction 5.19 4.87 4.60 1.70† 0.86
Specific prediction 13.99 12.21 11.93 2.66** 0.32
Best possible score 17.76 16.79 16.54 1.74† 0.33
Worst possible score 8.73 6.86 6.09 3.02** 0.86
Relative appraisal 51.99% 51.59% 46.83% 0.68 1.00
Accuracy, error, and bias
Prediction–performance discrepancy (bias)
M 4.39*** 2.22** 1.03 2.83** 0.35
(SD) (4.37) (2.98) (4.29)
Absolute deviation (error)
M 5.31*** 2.96*** 3.61*** 2.96** 0.79
(SD) (3.22) (2.55) (2.54)
Correlation
Pearson’s r #.14 .57** .45* z ! 2.66** z ! 0.53
Potential Mechanisms
Mood 3.32 3.26 3.46 0.30 1.42
Meaningfulness
Importance of doing well 4.62 3.92 3.62 2.01* 0.58
Pleased if score is better 6.01 5.40 5.55 2.24* 0.52
Disappointed if worse 4.67 3.74 4.07 2.33* 0.84
Diagnosticity of test 4.61 3.39 4.29 2.51* 2.50*
Importance of accuracy 3.77 3.52 3.35 0.82 0.36
Memory
Free recall 3.91 5.01 5.64 2.53* 0.96
Cued recall 2.46 3.05 3.41 2.99** 1.17
Note. The prediction measure and potential mechanism values are means. Scholastic Aptitude Test Verbal scores have been covaried out of the above
analyses.
† p " .10. * p " .05. ** p " .01. *** p " .001.
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participants in both of the test-expected conditions tended to
overestimate how well they would perform, neither group was as
optimistically biased (combined M ! 1.63) as participants in the
test-unexpected condition (M ! 4.39), p ! .019. Viewed another
way, among participants in the test-expected conditions, 1 in 3
(36%) met or exceeded their predicted score, and almost all (86%)
met or exceeded their worst-case prediction; by contrast, among
participants in the test-unexpected condition, only one in five
(20%) met or exceeded their predicted score, and just over half
(52%) met or exceeded their worst-case prediction.
As in Studies 1 and 2, participants in the test-expected condi-
tions were not only less biased but were also better calibrated than
participants in the test-unexpected condition. The average absolute
error between predictions and performance was significantly lower
among those who were expecting to complete the test (combined
M ! 3.29) than among those who were not expecting to complete
the test (M ! 5.31), p ! .004. Moreover, participants who ex-
pected to complete the test made predictions that were signifi-
cantly correlated with their actual scores (r ! .50, p " .001), but
participants who did not expect to take the test did not (r ! #.14,
ns), and this difference in correlations was significant (z ! 2.66,
p " .01). As with the other indicators of prediction accuracy,
neither absolute error nor the correlations between predicted and
actual scores were influenced by the feedback expectancy
manipulation.5
Possible Mechanisms
The lack of effects of the feedback manipulation renders the two
feedback hypotheses (self-protection and public accountability)
less plausible: If participants had been motivated to make more
accurate predictions out of a concern that their predictions might
be invalidated or out of a concern that others might view them
critically, the feedback expectancy manipulation would have been
expected to have had a significant effect on prediction and predic-
tion accuracy, and it did not. Although it remains possible that a
more powerful manipulation of feedback—perhaps with the addi-
tion of an evaluative component, or a clear public audience—may
have had a more discernible effect (see, e.g., Regan et al., 1975;
Sedikides et al., 2002), participants’ responses to the post-perfor-
mance questions described in Footnote 5 (and to the task diagnos-
ticity question, described below) suggest that they had attended to
the feedback manipulation and were affected by it.
Another mechanism that does not appear to account for the real
versus hypothetical effect is mood. As can be seen in Table 5,
neither the test-expectancy manipulation nor the feedback expect-
ancy manipulation had effects on participants’ reported mood (this
was true regardless of whether we looked at the composite mood
score, as reported in Table 5, separate indices of positive and
negative affect, or responses to individual items). Differences in
mood, therefore, do not appear to account for the observed differ-
ences in predictions and prediction accuracy.6
Participants did differ, however, in how meaningful they
thought the test would be (see Table 5). As predicted by construal
level theory, participants in the test-unexpected condition reported
that it would be more important for them to do well on the test
( p ! .049), that they would be more emotionally affected if they
over- or underperformed in relation to their prediction ( ps ! .028
and .023) and that the test would be more diagnostic of their true
ability ( p ! .014) than did participants in the test-expected con-
ditions. The feedback expectancy manipulation, by contrast, only
influenced the perceived diagnosticity of the test, revealing the
unsurprising finding that participants who did not expect to receive
feedback believed the test would be less diagnostic than those who
did expect feedback ( p ! .015). This effect—the sole significant
effect of the feedback manipulation on pre-performance mea-
sures—is important because it demonstrates that participants were
mindful of the manipulation and responded to it in a reasonable
way (see also Footnote 5) and suggests that the lack of effects of
this manipulation on the prediction and accuracy measures were
not the consequence of a failed manipulation.
As can be seen in Table 5, the test-expectancy manipulation also
influenced how much participants remembered about the test be-
fore they took it. Again in keeping with the construal-level hy-
pothesis, participants in the test-expected conditions were more
successful in recalling significant test details than were partici-
pants in the test-unexpected condition, and this was true both for
free recall ( p ! .014) and cued recall ( p ! .004). As was the case
with the prediction and prediction accuracy measures, memory for
test details was not influenced by the feedback expectancy
manipulations.
To determine whether the measures of meaningfulness and
memory for details mediated the effects of the test-expectancy
manipulation on prediction accuracy, we entered composite indi-
ces of meaningfulness ($ ! .77) and memory ($ ! .70) into a pair
of multiple mediator models (see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998;
Preacher & Hayes, 2005), one testing mediation of the test-
expectancy effect on prediction error, the other testing mediation
of the effect on prediction bias. We evaluated the mediation
hypotheses using a bootstrap approach advocated by Preacher and
Hayes (2005; for additional discussion of the value of bootstrap-
ping over other techniques for assessing mediation, such as the
Sobel test, see Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Results of these analyses
5 We do not wish to claim that the feedback manipulation had no effects
on optimism. The null effects of the feedback manipulation reported in the
text were observed on prediction measures that had been obtained before
the test was completed and thus well before the threat of feedback was
imminent. Additional measures obtained after participants had completed
the test revealed that participants in all conditions became pessimistic after
they completed the test (reporting that they had answered, on average, 0.59
fewer questions correctly than they actually did answer correctly, F(1,
71) ! 4.27, p ! .042; cf. Shepperd et al., 1996; Heath & Jourden, 1997)
but that this pessimism effect was more pronounced among those expecting
feedback (M ! #1.10) than among those who did not (M ! #0.46) and
those originally assigned to the test-unexpected condition (M ! #0.21). In
fact, when looked at within condition, this post-performance pessimism
only approached significance in the feedback-expected condition, t(24) !
1.93, p ! .066. Because these post-performance procedures and results are
beyond the scope of this article, they are not discussed further (for addi-
tional details, see Sackett, 2002).
6 Notably, mood was assessed after predictions. Therefore, it is possible
that participants in the test-expected conditions may have (a) experienced
a relatively negative mood prior to making predictions, (b) made more
modest predictions in response to that mood, and then (c) experienced
relief from that negative mood as a function of having made more modest
predictions. In this way, our lack of mood effects does not necessarily rule
out mood as a mechanism linking task completion expectations to predic-
tion accuracy. We thank James Shepperd for suggesting this interpretation.
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reveal that reported meaningfulness, but not memory for test
details, mediated the effects of the test-expectancy manipulation
on our index of prediction bias. Specifically, the direct effect of
test-expectancy on bias was rendered nonsignificant when the
mediators were included in the model, t(70) ! 1.58, p ! .12.
Moreover, the indirect effect through meaningfulness was statis-
tically significant: Using Preacher and Hayes’s bootstrapping pro-
cedure, we obtained a point estimate for this effect of #.18, with
a bias-adjusted and accelerated 95% confidence interval of#.44 to
#.01 (we can conclude that meaningfulness is a statistically sig-
nificant mediator because this confidence interval does not contain
zero). The indirect effect through memory, however, was not
significant: The point estimate for this effect was #.16, with a
bias-adjusted and accelerated 95% confidence interval of #.52 to
.03. Neither meaningfulness nor memory for test details were
found to mediate the effects of the test-expectancy manipulation
on our index of prediction error.
Alternate Explanations?
Although the meaningfulness and memory results are consistent
with a construal-level interpretation, alternative explanations are
possible. For example, the finding that participants in the test-
expected conditions appeared to downplay the meaningfulness of
the GRE test could be interpreted as a self-protective strategy
(dismissing the significance of the test could be an effective
strategy for minimizing the impact of receiving the low scores that
they expected to receive) rather than a result of lower-level con-
struals posited by temporal construal theory; however, the lack of
effects of the feedback expectancy manipulation would seem to
render this interpretation less plausible. A different explanation
could be invoked to explain the memory data: It is possible that
participants in the task-unexpected conditions may have remem-
bered fewer details about the test because they simply did not think
very carefully about tasks that they believed would remain hypo-
thetical. However, neither self-protection nor this “insufficient
processing” account can parsimoniously explain why participants
in the test-unexpected condition saw the test as more meaningful
and remembered fewer details about it than did participants in the
test-expected conditions.
Study 4: Making the Hypothetical Seem Real
Our final experiment was designed with two goals in mind.
First, we sought to determine whether the kinds of thought pro-
cesses invoked by the real prospect of completing a task could be
induced without requiring participants to actually complete the
task. In other words, we wanted to know whether personal predic-
tions could be made to be less optimistic even when the task under
consideration is understood to be purely hypothetical. If real tasks
are somehow more motivating or have more implications for
self-evaluation or self-protection, and if these features serve as
incentives to be accurate, then removing these features by making
the task hypothetical in all conditions should eliminate between-
condition differences in participants’ predictions. If, on the other
hand, the processes involved are largely imaginative, then one
should be able to mimic the conditions of taking a real test without
actually asking participants to complete the test. Therefore, in
Study 4, we asked all participants to imagine taking a test that they
knew they would not be asked to complete. Half of the participants
were assigned to a “context-unspecified” condition in which they
were asked to imagine our hypothetical test in the same way we
had asked participants to imagine the test in our prior test-
unexpected conditions, that is, without any specificity about when
or where they would complete the test. Remaining participants
were assigned to a “here-and-now” condition in which they were
asked to imagine not only that they would be taking the test but
also that they would be taking the test at that very moment (i.e., at
that exact time and in that location). The simple addition of these
temporal–local constraints on participants’ conceptualization of
the test was expected to make the hypothetical seem real—and
thereby to influence participants’ construal level of the test and
their predictions of how well they would perform on it—without
requiring them to actually complete the test.
As a second goal, we sought to further disentangle the construal-
level hypothesis (which focuses on the content of processing) from
the insufficient processing alternative (which focuses on quantity
of processing). We did this, in part, by asking participants to
elaborate on the factors that might influence their performance on
the GRE test either before or after they were asked to make
predictions. This procedure was intended both as a manipulation of
the extent to which participants elaborated on the test before
making predictions (allowing a test of the causal effect of more
thorough cognitive processing on optimistic predictions) as well as
a method for assessing cognitive content both before and after
participants made their predictions. If participants in our previous
task-unexpected conditions had been unrealistically optimistic be-
cause they had simply thought less thoroughly about the tasks in
question, then the following should hold true: (a) Participants in
the context-unspecified condition should generate fewer factors as
relevant to their performance (insofar as the context-unspecified
conditions are intended to replicate the task-unexpected conditions
of Studies 1 to 3) and (b) Encouraging participants to think more
thoroughly about the factors influencing their performance before




One hundred and two university students (64% women) were recruited
to participate in a brief study in exchange for a small incentive (a candy bar
or a cold drink).
Procedure
Participants were asked to make predictions about how well they thought
they would perform on a test of sample GRE questions. The test description
provided to participants was identical to the ones used in Studies 2 and 3.
The experimenter made it clear to all participants that they would not
actually be taking the test, and the experiment itself was presented as an
exercise in imagination.
Half of our participants were randomly assigned to a “context-
unspecified” condition—a condition directly analogous to the test-
unexpected conditions of Studies 2 and 3—in which they were asked to
imagine taking the GRE test without any constraints on when or where they
should imagine themselves taking the test. Remaining participants were
assigned to a “here-and-now” condition in which they were asked to
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imagine that they really would be taking the test and that they would be
doing so in the immediate present (i.e., at that moment and in that location).
To provide an experimental test of the insufficient processing hypothe-
sis, participants in each of the imagination conditions were randomly
assigned to either a “prior elaboration” condition (which was intended to
encourage effortful processing when making predictions) or to a “delayed
elaboration” condition (which was not). In the prior elaboration conditions,
participants were asked to “list as many factors as you can think of that
might influence your performance on this verbal test” before they were
asked to make their performance predictions. In the delayed elaboration
condition, participants were not asked to list influential factors until after
they had made their performance predictions.
As in the previous studies, participants were asked to make both general
(“how well?”) and specific (“how many?”) predictions, as well as a number
of other assessments (how difficult they thought the test would be, how
capable they would be of concentrating, how much they would enjoy the
test, and how motivated they would be to perform well).
Results and Discussion
Effects on Predictions
As hypothesized, participants in the “here-and-now” conditions,
who had been asked merely to imagine taking the test in the
immediate present, made more modest predictions and task assess-
ments than did participants in the context-unspecified (or “pure
hypothetical”) conditions. In comparison, participants in the
context-unspecified conditions expected to perform better on the
test (Ms! 5.54 vs. 4.78), F(1, 98)! 11.4, p" .001, and to answer
more questions correctly (Ms ! 15.0 vs. 13.6), F(1, 98) ! 4.82,
p ! .03. Notably, participants in both imagination conditions
expected to answer more questions correctly than participants
actually had answered correctly when taking the same test in
Studies 2 (M! 9.8) and 3 (M! 10.2), suggesting that both groups
were optimistically biased. Nonetheless, the significant between-
condition difference in predicted scores reveals that participants in
the here-and-now conditions were significantly closer to these
expected values.
In comparison with participants in the context-unspecified con-
ditions, participants in the here-and-now conditions also indicated
that they would enjoy the test less (Ms! 3.06 vs. 3.88), F(1, 98)!
6.22, p ! .014, that they would be less capable of concentrating
(Ms ! 3.60 vs. 5.25), F(1, 97) ! 32.7, p " .001, and that they
would be less motivated to perform well (Ms! 4.36 vs. 5.62), F(1,
98) ! 15.5, p " .001. The only responses that were unaffected by
the imagination manipulation were the assessments of task diffi-
culty (F " 1, ns).
In contrast to the effects of the imagination manipulation, which
significantly influenced responses on five of our six dependent
measures, the cognitive elaboration manipulation did not consis-
tently influence predictions or task assessments. The only trend to
approach significance was the question about anticipated motiva-
tion, with participants in the prior elaboration condition stating that
they would be less motivated (M ! 4.64) than participants in the
delayed elaboration condition (M ! 5.29), F(1, 98) ! 3.71, p !
.057 (all other Fs " 1). The order manipulation also did not
interact with the imagination condition to influence either predic-
tions (Fs " 1) or the other assessment measures (Fs " 2.9, ps %
.09). These results are thus inconsistent with the insufficient pro-
cessing hypothesis: Inducing participants to think more thoroughly
about the factors that might influence their performance did not
have a significant effect on their predictions, either as a main effect
or through selectively making seemingly “neglectful” participants
in the context-unspecified condition more mindful.
Factors Listed: Quantitative Differences
The lack of significant effects of the cognitive elaboration
manipulation does not appear to have been the consequence of an
unsuccessful manipulation: Participants in the prior elaboration
conditions listed more factors (M ! 8.46) than did participants in
the delayed elaboration conditions (M ! 6.90), F(1, 98) ! 4.47,
p ! .037, suggesting that participants in the prior elaboration
conditions had thought more thoroughly about these factors than
had participants in the delayed elaboration conditions. Thinking
thoroughly, then, does not appear to be a sufficient remedy for
overly optimistic predictions. A second strike against the insuffi-
cient processing hypothesis is that participants in the context
unspecified conditions, who did make more optimistic predictions,
did not appear to reason less thoroughly (and thus generate a
shorter list of causal factors) than participants in here-and-now
conditions; if anything, there was a trend in the reverse direction
(Ms ! 7.06 and 8.25, respectively), F(1, 98) ! 2.37, p ! .13.
Factors Listed: Qualitative Differences
Coding and analysis of the content of participants’ factor lists
provided additional insight into the thought processes involved in
the here-and-now and context-unspecified conditions. To facilitate
coding, each participant’s factor list was first partitioned into
single-factor units, and the resulting factors were then coded along
three independent dimensions (described below). In order to assess
rater reliability, a second rater coded factor lists from a random
sample of 20 participants drawn equally from all conditions
(24.6% of all factors generated). Interrater reliability was accept-
able for all three categories (agreement % 83%; kappas % .69).
Attribution. Drawing from conventional distinctions within
attribution theory (e.g., Kelley, 1967), causes were coded as mak-
ing reference to the self (person attributions), to the test (stimulus
attributions), or to the testing environment (circumstance attribu-
tions). In order to test predictions from construal-level theory,
self-attributions were further subdivided into stable self character-
istics (such as traits, general abilities, and test-taking experience)
and unstable self characteristics (such as current mood, alertness,
and level of concentration).
Overall, more than two thirds of the factors listed identified
aspects of the self, and the majority of these aspects referred to
unstable characteristics (including mood states, feelings of confi-
dence, alertness, health, and ability to concentrate). However, in
keeping with the predictions of construal level theory, participants
in the context-unspecified conditions were more than twice as
likely to make reference to stable aspects of themselves, such as to
their vocabulary, intelligence, and affinity for standardized tests,
than were participants in the here-and-now conditions (Ms ! 18%
and 8%, respectively), F(1, 97) ! 5.49, p ! .021. Participants in
the context-unspecified conditions were also twice as likely to
make reference to the only other stable factor (i.e., the test), though
this effect (7% vs. 3%) was only marginally significant, F(1, 97)!
3.45, p ! .066. Participants in the here-and-now conditions, by
contrast, made correspondingly greater reference to the two less
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stable factors: unstable self characteristics (59% vs. 53%) and the
environment (29% vs. 21%). None of these effects were moderated
by the order of the factor listing procedure (all interaction Fs "
2.0, all ps % .15).
Causal certainty. Some of the causal factors that participants
listed were described in such a way as to indicate that participants
were certain of their relevance to predicting test performance (e.g.,
“I generally do well on these kinds of tests”; “timed tests are
always bad”), and other factors were described so as to indicate
that participants were not sure of their relevance (e.g., “the
weather, maybe”; “I might get bored”). To capture this causal
certainty distinction, factors were coded as either definite or as
possible/uncertain.
Participants in the context-unspecified conditions expressed
greater uncertainty about whether the factors they listed would be
relevant to their performance on the GRE test, at least in the
delayed elaboration conditions. Analysis of the proportion of fac-
tors participants described as being of uncertain relevance to their
performance revealed a main effect of the imagination manipula-
tion, F(1, 97) ! 6.03, p ! .016, that was driven by a significant
interaction between the imagination and elaboration manipula-
tions, F(1, 97) ! 7.12, p ! .009. In the prior-elaboration condi-
tions, participants in the context-unspecified condition were un-
certain about roughly the same proportion of factors (M! 30%) as
were participants in the here-and-now conditions (M ! 32%). In
the delayed elaboration conditions, by contrast, participants in the
context-unspecified condition were uncertain about a much larger
proportion of factors (M ! 47%) than were participants in the
here-and-now condition (M ! 15%). Although the greater uncer-
tainty in the context-unspecified conditions is not surprising—this
uncertainty may explain why participants in these psychologically
distant conditions need to rely on abstract, gist-based representa-
tions of the target event (i.e., because so many of the specifics
remain unknown)—the reason behind the interaction effect is
unclear.
Causal valence. Coders also determined the expected effect of
each causal factor (or of the participants’ standing on these factors)
on test performance. Causal factors were coded as implying either
a positive effect on test performance (e.g., “I know a lot of
vocabulary”) or a negative effect on test performance (e.g., “lack
of preparation”). In some cases, participants listed causal factors
without specifying the nature of the effect it may have (e.g., “my
mood might influence my performance”) or explicitly indicated
uncertainty about the likely effect (e.g., “the test format is odd. . .
I’m not sure whether that will be a good thing or a bad thing”);
these factors were coded as unspecified/unknown, and reflected a
different kind of uncertainty.
Participants in the here-and-now conditions identified propor-
tionally more factors that would have negative implications for
their performance (M ! 41%) than did participants in the context-
unspecified conditions (M ! 21%), suggesting that these partici-
pants may have been thinking more self-critically (see Gilovich et
al., 1993, Study 4; see also Tetlock, 1992; Tetlock & Kim, 1987;
cf. Eyal, Liberman, Trope, & Walther, 2004). Neither group was
particularly inclined to identify factors that would have clearly
positive effects on their performance (Ms ! 13% and 15%, re-
spectively). However, in keeping with the results of the causal
certainty codes, participants in the context-unspecified conditions
listed factors that were more frequently coded as having unspec-
ified or unknown effects (M ! 64%) than factors listed by partic-
ipants in the here-and-now conditions (M ! 45%), again suggest-
ing that participants in the context-unspecified conditions were
facing greater uncertainty when formulating their predictions. In
contrast to the results with the causal certainty codes, however,
these causal valence results were not moderated by the elaboration
order manipulation.
Summary. The coded data help explain both the logic of con-
strual level theory and the general implausibility of the insufficient
processing hypothesis. Participants in the context-unspecified con-
dition were asked to confront a prediction task facing many un-
knowns—what the testing conditions would be like, what their
own mental and physical state would be like at the time of the test,
and so on—whereas participants in the here-and-now condition
were confronted with the same prediction task with many fewer
unknowns. It thus does not appear that participants in the test-
unexpected conditions were simply thinking less thoroughly about
the determinants of their performance (though they do appear to
have been thinking about them less self-critically; see also Gilov-
ich et al., 1993). The added uncertainty inherent in hypothetical
events—“when?” “where?” “what kind of state will I be in?”—
thus creates a more complex prediction task, one that may not be
solvable through the simple application of cognitive effort.
General Discussion
As early as LaPiere’s (1934) analysis of attitude–behavior in-
consistencies, psychologists have been aware that people’s claims
about their beliefs and behaviors will differ depending on the
social context in which they find themselves. Although LaPiere’s
classic study may be more familiarly discussed in the context of
attitudes and behavior (e.g., Kraus, 1995; Wicker, 1969), the
questions LaPiere asked of his respondents were, in fact, behav-
ioral predictions, and those predictions were asked anonymously
and without the expectation that they would subsequently be put to
test. Results of LaPiere’s inquiries, and many others since, have
consistently shown that under hypothetical, task-unexpected con-
ditions, people tend to make predictions that are largely in line
with societal expectations and aspirations of the day (see also Linn,
1965; Sherman, 1980; Weinstein, 1980; Woodzicka & LaFrance,
2001). In short, they tend to make predictions that are unrealisti-
cally optimistic.
Results from the four studies presented here revealed that peo-
ple’s claims about their own expected outcomes will also differ
depending on the context in which their predictions are made.
Participants who had been asked to make predictions about per-
formance on tasks they thought were hypothetical made predic-
tions that were unrealistically optimistic in the truest sense of the
term: They overestimated how they would perform, often by large
margins, and their predictions were, at best, only weakly correlated
with their actual performance. By contrast, participants who had
been asked to make predictions about their performance on tasks
that they knew they would complete made predictions that were
impressively accurate: Their predictions, on average, did not de-
viate from their average performance, their overall rate of error
was reduced, and their predictions were strongly correlated with
their performance. These results are consistent with Armor and
Taylor’s (1998, 2002) suggestion that optimistic biases are not
invariant within persons but rather are situated within contexts:
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These biases do not appear to be an inevitable part of the predic-
tion process, individual forecasters do not appear to be indiscrim-
inately optimistic, and the expression of these biases appears to be
largely dependent on the psychological context in which predic-
tions are made (for similar conclusions, see also Armor & Taylor,
2003; Sackett & Armor, 2005a; Shepperd et al., 2006).
The results of these studies are also broadly consistent with
Gilovich et al.’s (1993; Savitsky et al., 1998) work on the effects
of temporal distance on subjective confidence and with Trope and
Liberman’s (2003) suggestion that task hypotheticality and tem-
poral proximity may be effectively analogous as manipulations of
“psychological distance.” The results of these studies go beyond
those of Gilovich et al., however, by showing that predictions for
real, proximal events are not only less biased than predictions for
hypothetical events, but that they are more accurate as well. By
measuring performance as a criterion for prediction accuracy,
estimates of accuracy, error, and bias could be assessed and
compared across conditions.
It is worth noting that the measures of relative appraisals—that
is, the measures of how well participants thought they would
perform in comparison with other people—yielded results that, in
Studies 1 and 2 at least, were perfectly misleading about the
accuracy of participants’ predictions. Although responses to these
measures revealed a consistent decline in optimism in the task-
expected conditions, they also suggested that participants in the
task-unexpected conditions were the ones who were accurate (hav-
ing claimed that they would perform about the same as others on
average) and that participants in the task-expected conditions were
biased (having claimed that they would perform worse than oth-
ers). Although these results were not expected, they are not un-
precedented: Savitsky et al. (1998) obtained similar results in the
context of a study of the effects of temporal distance. One possible
explanation is that the performance tasks we used in these studies
may have been seen as particularly difficult and that the hypothet-
ical nature of the task may have led participants in the task-
unexpected conditions to overcome their normal tendency to be
pessimistic when contemplating difficult tasks (Kruger, 1999; see
also Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006; Chambers & Windschitl,
2004). Understanding these differences, and the general correspon-
dence (or lack of correspondence) between various measures of
prediction accuracy and bias will be an important challenge for
future research.
Another interesting result is that, in the three studies in which
behavior was measured, we found little evidence of predictions
leading to self-fulfilling prophecy. An impressive body of research
suggests that, in Sherman’s (1980) words, optimistic errors of
prediction can be “self erasing,” with even overly optimistic fore-
casts helping to bring about the expected outcomes (see also
Armor & Taylor, 2003; Cervone & Peake, 1986; Sherman, Skov,
Hervitz, & Stock, 1981; for a review, see Armor & Taylor, 2002).
However, other studies have shown that even successful manipu-
lations of people’s expectations do not always lead to changes in
behavior (e.g., Wilson & LaFleur, 1995). In our experiments,
participants in the task-unexpected conditions made predictions
that were dramatically more optimistic than the predictions made
by participants in the task-expected conditions, but this optimism
did not carry over to influence performance. Understanding when
and why predictions sometimes do and sometimes do not lead to
self-fulfilling prophecy is another important question for future
research. One possible hypothesis is that predictions for real,
proximate behavior (which were here found to be highly correlated
with performance) may be sufficiently tied to people’s behavior to
be self-fulfilling but that predictions for hypothetical behaviors
(which were not found to be correlated with performance) may be
relatively untethered and therefore not self-fulfilling (cf. Oettingen
& Mayer, 2002). In other words, the truly unrealistic predictions
made by participants in our task-unexpected conditions may have
been too far removed from reality to have influenced subsequent
behavior.
A Construal-Level Interpretation
Studies 3 and 4 also provide some initial evidence about why
participants’ predictions were unrealistically optimistic in the task-
unexpected conditions but realistic in the task-expected conditions.
Although many factors are likely to contribute to unrealistic opti-
mism (Armor & Taylor, 1998; Buehler et al., 2002; Sackett &
Armor, 2005b) and to prediction accuracy (Osberg & Shrauger,
1986), the results of Studies 3 and 4 suggest that the level of
abstraction at which people represent real and hypothetical actions
and events may contribute to the degree of accuracy, error, and
bias present in people’s predictions. As predicted by construal-
level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), participants in the task-
unexpected conditions appeared to represent the hypothetical tasks
in more abstract, high-level terms than did participants in the
task-expected conditions: They saw the GRE test as more mean-
ingful yet remembered fewer particular details about the test and,
when listing factors that might influence their performance, tended
to list more stable and fewer fleeting factors, which suggests that
the participants were representing their performance on the task in
more general, gist-based terms.
In some respects, the construal-level results, too, were antici-
pated by LaPiere (1934), who argued that a participant’s response
to a question is merely “a symbolic response to a symbolic situ-
ation” (p. 230), though construal level theory offers greater spec-
ificity about how these situations (and people’s imagined re-
sponses to them) will be symbolized. Results of Study 4 suggest
that participants in the context-unspecified conditions were not
only representing the “symbolic situation” (i.e., the performance
task) in more abstract, high-level terms, but that they were also
imagining their “symbolic response” to that task (i.e., their behav-
ior) in more abstract, higher level terms as well. Research on
self-evaluation has shown that, when people are asked to evaluate
themselves in increasingly abstract terms, they tend to evaluate
themselves much more positively than if they had been asked to
evaluate themselves in more concrete terms (e.g., Dunning, Mey-
erowitz, & Holzberg, 1989). An intriguing question for future
research is whether people are more inclined to rely on these
abstract (and presumably positive) self-assessments when making
predictions for hypothetical or otherwise psychologically distant
tasks (cf. Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003).
Although construal level theory provides a reasonable account
of the real versus hypothetical effects obtained in these studies,
several questions remain. For example, it is not clear how con-
strual level theory would explain why participants in the task-
expected conditions appeared to be pessimistic on the relative
appraisal measures (though these results may be more of a chal-
lenge for the interpretation of relative appraisal measures of opti-
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mism than for the application of construal-level theory). The
construal theory account would also be further strengthened by
additional data showing that the level of construal mediates the
effects of task hypotheticality on optimistic predictions.
How Unrealistic Is Unrealistic Optimism?
The results of the studies reported here suggest a pair of very
different conclusions about the nature of unrealistic optimism. On
one hand, the predictions made by participants in the task-
unexpected conditions demonstrate that people’s predictions can
be truly unrealistic. These data would appear to offer further
validation to a growing list of studies that have characterized
people’s predictions as unrealistically optimistic (Armor & Taylor,
1998, 2002) and, like data from studies of the planning fallacy
(Buehler et al., 2002), show how inaccurate people’s predictions
can be when their predictions are compared to performance. On the
other hand, the results of these experiments could be taken to
suggest that the prevalence of unrealistic optimism may be over-
stated, and that the frequently documented expressions of exces-
sive optimism may be partly enabled by the anonymous,
consequence-free prediction environments in which optimistic
forecasts are so commonly studied. Our studies show that despite
a strong reputation for being optimistic, people appear to have a
clear capacity to put optimistic biases aside and to be quite accu-
rate when making predictions.
We do not wish to claim, however, that optimistic biases are
therefore necessarily the artifacts of anonymity, or that these biases
are “hothouse creations” that will not be expressed in more con-
sequential settings. Although a majority of studies on optimistic
biases have been conducted in contexts free of consequence, these
biases have been documented in increasingly diverse settings,
including those in which consequences for inaccurate predictions
are more immediate and real (e.g., Camerer & Lovallo, 1999;
Glare et al., 2003; Lim, 2001; for review, see Dunning, Heath, &
Suls, 2004). Our central argument is that context matters. Exam-
ining optimistic biases across meaningfully different contexts can
help establish the generalizability of these biases, but cross-context
comparisons can also usefully inform theory about the underlying
processes involved in making predictions that are accurate, erro-
neous, or biased.
We would also like to emphasize that, despite the contextually
situated nature of unrealistic optimism, the predictions people
make when thinking about hypothetical events may nonetheless be
quite important. Although these “symbolic responses” appear to be
much revised in situations in which people recognize that their
predictions may be tested, these predictions may nonetheless in-
fluence behavior and outcomes in the situations in which they are
expressed. People are often asked to make predictions about events
or outcomes that are, at the time of prediction, essentially hypo-
thetical. People may also rely on optimistic estimates of what they
would have done in a particular situation when judging what
another person actually did in that situation, which could lead to
overly critical interpersonal assessments. Further, psychologically,
these optimistic forecasts may be important because they symbol-
ize a future that one hopes to achieve and, thus, may be a source
of comfort, pride, or self-esteem.
Trains in the Distance
In his own melancholy way, Paul Simon evoked our central
findings when he sang that “everybody loves the sound of a train
in the distance” (Simon, 1983, track 7). The success of the song,
and this lyric in particular, is that we can all conjure up an image
of the distant rumblings of a rolling train and agree that the sound
evokes pleasing feelings of intrigue, adventure, and forward pur-
pose. Like Simon’s doomed-to-be-disillusioned lovers, partici-
pants in our psychologically distant, task-unexpected conditions
were found to romanticize about even the most mundane of tasks,
spinning optimistic fantasies about their performance on scavenger
hunts and GREs. Moreover, participants in these task-unexpected
conditions appeared to make their predictions without considering
that if they were standing on the railroad tracks of immediate
action, they might see things quite differently.
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